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Abstract
In the context of the Doha Development Round, the vast majority of computable general equilibrium studies examine
agricultural trade led gains to developing countries, whilst European Union based studies are scarce and only one
assessment exists in the case of Spain. This study also focuses on Spain, whilst developing the literature in two ways.
Firstly, a more realistic representation of the agriculture sector is undertaken through modelling improvements to
agricultural factor-, input- and product markets. Secondly, the policy scenarios now account for tariff «binding
overhangs», thereby better reflecting the true level of market access from a potential agreement, whilst the trade led
impacts are examined from the inclusion of «sensitive» product lines within the harmonised tariff formula. Through
careful scenario design, protection and support reforms are implemented in three «Doha» experiments to reflect the
current negotiations, each with different levels of tariff reductions (i.e., market access). Spain experiences equivalent
variation (EV) losses in all scenarios reflecting shallower tariff reductions from the tariff binding overhangs, whilst
EV losses are minimised when agro-food market access is increased due to allocative efficiency improvements. The
size of the predicted EV losses are «broadly» in line with the literature, although specified modelling changes to the
agricultural sectors result in a different set of conclusions with respect to price, output and trade balance trends. Finally,
in our «likely» Doha scenario including sensitive tariff lines, potential global trade gains are severely limited whilst
Spanish welfare losses are maximised.
Additional key words: computable general equilibrium, GTAP model.
Resumen
Estimaciones de los beneficios para la economía española de un potencial acuerdo en la Ronda de Doha 
sobre comercio agrario
En el contexto de la Ronda de Doha, la mayoría de estudios se concentra en los beneficios derivados del comercio
agrario para los países en desarrollo. Los estudios sobre la Unión Europea son escasos, y el único artículo existente
sobre España es el que intentamos mejorar en el presente estudio. Primero, mejoramos la modelización de los mer-
cados de inputs, factores y productos, para representar el sector agrario de forma más realista. Segundo, los escena-
rios contemplan el excedente de consolidación de arancel aduanero para aproximar mejor el nivel real de apertura de
los mercados. Además, también examinamos los efectos derivados de la inclusión de los productos «sensibles» den-
tro de la fórmula arancelaria. Mediante un diseño cuidadoso, aplicamos las reformas sobre protección y apoyo en tres
experimentos que reflejan las negociaciones en curso. España experimenta pérdidas en variación equivalente (EV) en
todos los escenarios, como resultado del escaso impacto de la apertura de mercados a consecuencia del elevado ex-
cedente de consolidación de arancel aduanero. Las pérdidas se minimizan cuando se incrementa la apertura de los
mercados gracias a mejoras en la eficiencia asignativa. La magnitud de las pérdidas en EV se aproxima, en general,
a la literatura existente, aunque los cambios en la caracterización de los mercados agrícolas en nuestro modelo reve-
lan tendencias distintas por lo que respecta a precios, producciones y balanzas comerciales. Por último, en el escena-
rio en el que se incluyen aranceles de productos «sensibles», el potencial de beneficios globales se ve seriamente li-
mitado, mientras que las pérdidas de bienestar en España se maximizan.
Palabras clave adicionales: equilibrio general computable, modelo GTAP.
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Introduction1
Ever since its inception in the Qatari capital of Doha,
the Doha Development Round (DDR) has been fraught
with difficulty resulting in stop-start negotiations. At
the fifth Ministerial World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Meeting in Cancún, 2003, the collapse of the talks was
due to strong objections by developing nations on the
agricultural elements of the proposals. Indeed, with
the developing countries now organised into two nego-
tiating blocs2, this show of strength marked something
of a departure from the Uruguay Round. In Geneva,
2004, the DDR appeared to have regained momentum,
with a broad commitment from all WTO members
toward a general framework on the modalities of export
competition, domestic support and market access (the
July Framework Agreement) as a basis of negotiation.
In principle, the EU, USA, Japan and Brazil agreed to
eliminate agricultural export subsidies and reduce
trade-distorting subsidies, whilst the developing countries
consented to greater market access in manufacturing
industries, with exceptions for «key» industries. At the
sixth Ministerial WTO Meeting in Hong Kong, 2005,
it was agreed to totally eliminate export subsidies in
cotton and agriculture by the end of 2006 and 2013
respectively. However, the talks had languished over
the «modalities» of market access (i.e., tariff reductions)
and domestic support, whilst last ditch attempts in
Geneva, 2006, to salvage an agreement from the DDR
broke down, leading WTO chief Pascal Lamy to formally
suspend negotiations.
In January 2007, in Davos, negotiations resumed,
but once again the talks have been turbulent. In April,
discussions between the G43 of Brazil, India, the EU
and the USA stalled when the former two left the
negotiating table. The success of the round was further
jeopardised with the expiration in July of the US’Trade
Promotion Act. From now on, the US Congress resumes
its right to make amendments to any WTO trade deal,
which in turn compromises the authority of the US
trade representatives to make real concessions. As a
result, it appears unlikely that potentially «unpopular»
concessions will be made so close to the US presidential
elections in November 2008.
Current issues
With a consensus already reached on the abolition
of agricultural export subsidies, there is much needed
progress on the «modalities» for agricultural market
access and domestic support. In July, the current
Chairman of the Agricultural Negotiating Committee,
Crawford Falconer, tabled a draft agricultural modalities
text (WTO, 2007) to kick start the negotiations. As with
the July 2004 Framework (WTO, 2004), the document
is necessarily devoid of specifics in certain areas since
it represents a negotiating «middle-ground» between
all WTO members, although it does appear to be asking
for greater concessions from developed countries.
In terms of market access, there is renewed commit-
ment toward a banded harmonisation formula, proposing
average tariff reductions in bound or ceiling rates for
each tariff rate tier, subject to a minimum tariff cut per
tariff line, although the exact reductions are still under
negotiation. In the document, developed countries are
being asked to cut tariffs by up to 73% (which is above
the EU’s original offer of 60%). As before, there are
three exceptions to the application of the reduction
formula: sensitive products, special products and the
special safeguard mechanism.
In the first category, all countries may specify an
«appropriate» number of sensitive products which in
turn will face lesser tariff cuts and tariff quota increases.
In the Falconer document, it suggests that countries
may declare 4-6% of tariff lines as «sensitive» (below
the EU’s position of 8% and above the US’ position of
1%). In the second category developing countries have
recourse, subject to food security, livelihood and rural
development criteria, to a certain number of «special
products», although the criteria for what these special
products are remains nebulous. Finally, a special safe-
1 Abbreviations used: AMS (aggregate measure of support), CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), CD (Cobb Douglas), CDE
(Constant Difference of Elasticity), CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution), CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation), CGE
(Computable General Equilibrium), c.i.f. (cost, insurance and and freight), DDR (Doha Development Round), EU (European Union),
EV (equivalent variation), f.o.b. (free on board), GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project), LDC (Least Developed Country), OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), TRQ (Tariff Rate Quota), WTO (World Trade Organisation), €m
(million euros).
2 The G-20: middle-income developing countries; and the G-90: poorer developing countries.
3 The key players in the negotiations, known as the G6, are Brazil and India (representing the G20 group), the EU, the USA, Australia
(representing the Cairns group of agricultural exporters) and Japan (representing the G10 group of net agricultural importers).
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guard mechanism will be established to protect deve-
loping countries against, for example, import surges or
large drops in prices, however, again, the precise scope
and application of this scheme has yet to be clearly defined.
In terms of domestic support, a tiered formula is
proposed based on the level of aggregate measure of
support (AMS) over a base period, where those nego-
tiating members in the top band (i.e., EU) are being
asked to reduce support by 70%4. The Falconer document
also maintains the strategy of imposing gentler cuts
for developing countries over a longer time period. The
Falconer document also maintains its commitment to
ensure that Blue Box payments (linked to fixed pro-
duction limits) are genuinely less trade-distorting than
Amber Box measures, whilst the text reduces the cap
on the value of Blue Box support as a percentage of
agricultural production (i.e., de minimis) from 5% to
2.5%. The treatment of Green Box also remains con-
troversial, with specific wording in the text to ensure
that the basic principle of non- or minimal trade distortion
is respected. However, opinions still differ on disciplines
to prevent Green Box supports from distorting trade,
although it is looking more likely that income supports
that are separated (decoupled) from production will be
broadly based on «fixed and unchanging» base periods.
Literature review and aims
Quantitative impact assessment of the ongoing DDR
of trade negotiations has almost exclusively been
within the domain of global computable general equi-
librium (CGE) analysis. All almost in cases, CGE studies
use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database
with its detailed input-output, trade and final demand
accounts, support and protection data across 87 regions
and 57 sectors. Given the explicit mandate of the DDR,
to extend «aid-through-trade» opportunities to developing
and least developed countries, the vast majority of
DDR CGE applications focus on the distributive gains
to «poorer» WTO members (inter alia, Anderson et
al., 2005; Bouet et al., 2005; Francois et al., 2005)5,
whilst there is a paucity of EU focused DDR studies.
In the case of Spain, there are recent studies examining
the implications of multilateral trade agreements on
the CAP (Atance-Muñiz et al., 2007), with some relevant
discussion for the Spanish economy (Álvarez-Coque
and Atance-Muñiz, 2007). Notwithstanding, there is only
one quantitative impact study (Philippidis, 2005) exa-
mining the implications of a DDR agreement for Spain.
The aim of this paper was to consolidate and signifi-
cantly improve this study. Firstly, wholesale changes
were made to more realistically characterise the vagaries
of agricultural factor (land, labour and capital) and
intermediate input (particularly feed inputs) markets,
whilst the model code to capture the common agricultural
policy (CAP) is developed further, employing improved
secondary data estimates and expert advice. Secondly,
the import demand structure in the EU regions of the
GTAP model was modified to differentiate between
intra-EU and extra-EU trade flows, thereby capturing
greater product harmonisation within the single market.
Finally, and most importantly, the recent work from
Jean et al. (2005) was adapted to include a treatment
of «sensitive» product tariff lines whilst also accounting
for the «binding overhangs»6 in both the areas of
market access and domestic support.
Material and Methods
Modified GTAP model description7
To ensure a general equilibrium, a large system of
market clearing equations were implemented to gua-
rantee that all factor, input and commodity markets
clear (i.e., demand equals supply). Moreover, accounting
identities ensure that regional households and producers
remain on their budget and cost constraints respectively,
household expenditures equal household incomes (i.e.,
tax/tariff revenues and ownership of factors of pro-
duction), and that long-run zero profits prevail in all
production sectors.
To characterise consumer demands, neoclassical
utility maximisation was employed to determine three
types of «regional household»8. Thus, in the model, a
4 Once again, this proposal exceeds the 60% upper limit cut proposed by the (then) Chairperson of the Agricultural Negotiating
Committee, Stuart Harbinson (WTO, 2003).
5 For an updated discussion and comparison of DDR impact studies within the CGE literature, see Philippidis (2005).
6 See later for further discussion.
7 For a full description of the standard GTAP model, see Hertel (1997).
8 The regional household is a «representative» accounting entity designed to encompass the activities of all individuals in each
region [i.e., consumers, businessmen (investors and ownership of factors), government activity (tax and spend) etc.].
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Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function for region «r»
consists of private consumer demands (UPr), government
(or public) consumer demands (UGr) and savings
(investment demands) (USAVEr), where α, β and δ are
elasticities:
[1]
Maximising [1] subject to the regional budget cons-
traint, yields CD Marshallian aggregate demands in
each region «r» by each agent:
[2]
Weak homothetic separability assumptions were
employed to further partition aggregate private and
public consumer decisions into «nests» (multi-stage
budgeting) based on conventional neo-classical behaviour
(cost minimisation). Thus, at the second level of the
nest, private expenditures were minimised subject to
a non-homothetic constant difference in elasticities
(CDE) function9 to derive Hicksian demands for each
commodity «i». At the third layer of the nest, private
expenditure on each commodity «i» is minimised
subject to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function to yield Hicksian commodity demands by
origin (i.e., domestic vs. «composite» import demands).
Finally, CES expenditure minimisation yielded bilateral
import demands by region of origin at the fourth level
of the nest10. Public expenditure had the same nesting
structure, although in the second level of the nest, the
CDE function was substituted for a simpler CD treatment.
In this model variant, the third and fourth level nests
in the EU regions were modified to account for diffe-
rences in intra-EU and extra-EU trade demands11. More
specifically, increased harmonisation of EU product
standards were captured resulting in greater product
substitution in the model (Harrison et al., 1996; Herok
et al., 2002). Indeed, Herok et al. (2002) note that with
«deep» integration, «price differentials become smaller
as buyers more easily substitute among the products
from different member states» (p. 2). Consequently, it
was assumed that the (Armington) substitution elasticities
on intra-EU trade were double the «standard» elasticities
(Herok et al., 2002).
The production structure was also nested, were in
this study a number of improvements were made on
the «standard» treatment. Following the work of Keeney
and Hertel (2005), Hicksian cost minimising demands
for composite value added (primary factors) and inter-
mediate inputs in the top nest now exhibit CES subs-
titution possibilities12. In the second level of the pro-
duction structure, primary factors are CES substitutable
within a separate nest. The derivation of intermediate
input demands into domestic and composite imports
(nest level 2), and imports by region of origin (nest
level 3) followed the same (modified) CES treatment
as the consumption nested structure13. Furthermore, in
the livestock sectors, intermediate feed inputs now
have a separate sub-nest and were also price sensitive,
subject to a CES technology14.
Production activities are characterised as perfectly
competitive and constant returns to scale, whilst supply
by each sector is «demand driven» employing zero
profit equations (i.e., supply equals final demand)15.
Thus, value of production of good «j» in region «r»
(VOAj,r) was determined by total primary factor and
intermediate input demand costs by using sector «j»
in region «r» (VFAi,j,r).
[3]
The model incorporates f ive primary factors16,
where once again, we improved the standard treatment
of agricultural factor markets following the work of
Keeney and Hertel (2005). To capture the observed
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9 The CDE function allows the modeller to calibrate differing price and income elasticities which offer a much richer characterisation
of final demands than the standard Cobb-Douglas (CD) or CES functions.
10 This level is also known as the Armington specification which permits two-way trade in otherwise homogeneous products through
use of the elasticity of substitution between competing products.
11 See Figure 1 in the appendix for a full description of the nesting structure.
12 In the GTAP model, a Leontief function characterises the combination of intermediate inputs and primary factors. This implies
that, for example, the intensiveness of fertiliser application on land cannot alter with a policy change. In the current study, this
unrealistic restriction is removed. For further discussion of the nesting structure, see Keeney and Hertel (2005).
13 Intermediate input demands also distinguish between intra-EU and extra-EU import sources (see appendix).
14 In the GTAP model, intermediate input substitution is subject to a simplistic Leontief technology.
15 In GTAP there are no explicit supply functions for goods and services.
16 Land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital and natural resources.
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rigidity between agricultural/non-agricultural markets
leading to wage and rent differentials, labour and capital
allocation was controlled through a constant elasticity
of transformation (CET) function17:
[4]
where δi,r is a CET share parameter; Ai,r is a scale para-
meter; and ρi is an elasticity parameter. Maximising
revenue subject to the CET function [4], yields the
allocation of capital and labour factor «i» to the agricu-
ltural (QOAGR) and non-agricultural (QONAGR)
sectors, where the elasticity of transformation (σi) de-
termines the degree of labour/capital supply responsi-
veness to relative price changes between using sub-
sectors.
In the standard GTAP model, land is exclusively
employed in the primary agricultural sectors, and is
«sluggishly» allocated across all using sectors «j», by
a single CET elasticity. This implies that land is «ho-
mogeneous» in that it is equally substitutable between
agricultural activities. In this study, we removed this
restrictive assumption by following a similar treatment
to the OECD’s policy evaluation model (OECD, 2003).
Thus, employing a three-stage weakly separable CET
revenue maximisation problem, agricultural sectors
were grouped into nests according to the ease of substi-
tutability of land. Descending down the nest, the CET
elasticity doubles, implying easier substitution of land
between competing agricultural uses18. To maintain
equilibrium, market clearing equations between
sluggish primary factor demands (QFEi,j,r) and supplies
(QOESi,j,r) were implemented for each using sector «j»:
[5]
To apportion investment demands (i.e., regional
savings) across regions, GTAP employs a f ictitious
agent, known as the «global bank», which collects
global investment funds (all regions’ savings) and
disburses them to each region based on fixed regional
investment shares. Assuming all domestic and trade
markets clear, the supply of global capital/investment
goods (WALRAS_SUP) must be equal to the sum of
all savings demands (WALRAS_DEM), thereby satis-
fying Walras’ law.
Once the model structure was formalised and cali-
brated to the chosen data aggregation, specific macro-
economic or trade policy scenario questions can be
addressed by imposing exogenous shocks to key policy
variables (i.e., changes to tax/subsidy rates, primary
factor supplies, technical change variables etc.). The
model responds with the interaction of economic agents
within each market, where an outcome is characterised
by a new series of equilibrium conditions.
Common agricultural policy and trade policy
modelling improvements
A necessary pre-requisite for a credible analysis of
trade reform on EU agricultural product markets requires
an explicit representation of the CAP and trade policy
mechanisms. Once again, improvements have been
made to the modelling of the CAP19. Firstly, detailed
GTAP support data from Dimaranan (2006) were
employed to remove all sub-national and national
payments from the CAP budget20. Since these payments
account for approximately 20% of domestic support,
they will lead to a misspecification of the impact of
CAP budget changes in each region.
In addition, based on detailed consultation with Defra
(2007), only coupled support is removed from those
sectors which are inserted in the single farm payment
(SFP). Previously, when implementing the SFP, all
domestic support was removed. This incorrectly implies
that all current Blue Box support is transferred to the
Green Box, thereby escaping the disciplines of Blue
Box support reductions. Elsewhere, agricultural inter-
vention purchases were explicitly incorporated, whilst
the benchmark estimates of the milk quota and sugar
quota rents were improved to account for the competitive
efficiency of the downstream processing sectors, based
on a broader array of literature sources (Frandsen 
et al., 2003; Jensen and Frandsen, 2003; European
Commission, 2005; Lips and Rieder, 2005; Moro et
al., 2005) and expert opinion from within Defra (2007).
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17 For a fuller description, see Keeney and Hertel (2005).
18 See Figure 2 in the technical appendix for a description of the nesting structure.
19 The CAP modelling module is similar to Philippidis (2005), and follows the description in the appendix to that article.
Notwithstanding, important changes have been made, which are discussed in the main text.
20 These payments are not part of EU common funds but rather are funded nationally by member states.
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In the DDR, the negotiations are centred on the
reduction of bound (or ceiling) tariff rates, whilst in
the GTAP database, applied tariff rates are employed,
which may be equal to or less than the bound rate21.
Consequently, a reduction in the bound rate could con-
ceivably have little or no impact on real market access
due to the «binding overhang»22. From Spain’s pers-
pective, there are no studies in the literature which deal
with this important effect (i.e., it has been simply
assumed that bound and applied rates are equal). This
implies that the market access potential of the DDR
simulations is overstated, which in turn exaggerates
the estimated gains from trade to all member countries.
In this study, we employ recent work (Jean et al., 2005)
on Doha tariff reductions accounting for the binding
overhang, which is publicly available to subscribers of
the GTAP 6 Data. More specifically, a series of scenarios
have been provided, with accompanying tariff shocks,
to explore and enumerate a range of possible alternatives
that are currently on the negotiating table.
The same line of reasoning applies to negotiated cuts
in domestic support, which are based on AMS «ceiling
limits», rather than (lower) «applied» levels of AMS
expenditures. We employ secondary data sources (WTO,
2006) to ascertain the AMS expenditure overhang
when implementing Amber Box and Blue Box support
reductions to applied expenditure levels.
GTAP database
The GTAP version 6 database is benchmarked to the
year 2001, covering 87 regions and 57 commodities,
and combines secondary data sources of regional
input-output tables, bilateral trade data, protection and
support data and transport margin data. From an EU
perspective, the database includes all of the 27 members
states, although to maintain the model at manageable
proportions, the regional aggregation incorporates the
«big three» EU economies (France, Germany, UK) and
Spain, whilst the remaining EU members, now including
the 2007 EU accession members, were grouped into
composite regions (see Table 1). Given the focus on
agriculture and food, all major EU crops and livestock
sectors were disaggregated from the GTAP database,
with remaining non-agricultural regions aggregated
into «raw materials», «manufacturing» and «services»
(see Table 1).
Scenario design
In this study the standard GTAP framework was
extended to include a plausible long run baseline scenario
projected from the benchmark year (2001) to 2020
against which we compared our Doha Round Scenario.
The baseline scenario is described in Table 2.
Compared with the baseline, a series of «plausible»
Doha scenarios were examined, which are described
in Table 3. Leaving the tariff cuts to one side, the «Doha
scenarios» include reductions on Blue Box payments
to fulf il the de minimis ceiling criteria of 2.5% and
reductions of 70% (50%) in Amber Box support for
the developed (developing) countries. In the EU, what
is not transferred into the Green Box under the SFP is
treated as a Blue Box payment.
Whilst the original Harbinson tiered tariff proposals
were not accepted, they still reflect the basis of the
negotiating positions between WTO members (Jean et
al., 2005). Indeed, the Falconer document (WTO,
2007), specif ies that the reductions should still be
undertaken using a tiered formula, in which larger cuts
are made on higher tariffs. Thus, in scenarios 1 and 2
and 3, a «harmonising» or tiered tariff reduction for-
mula is employed in the agro-food products where
greater tariff cuts are applicable on higher bound tariff
rates23.
In Table 4, the scale of the bound tariff cuts are detailed
for each of the three policy scenarios. In the lower part
of Table 4 are shown the bound tariff reductions for the
«light» harmonising formula, which implements cuts
10% points weaker than the equivalent harmonisa-
tion formula in scenarios one and two. On tariff rate
quota (TRQ) bilateral routes, both in- and over-quota
rates were reduced by the prescribed percentage cuts,
whilst the quota was increased to 5% of present
21 Member countries exaggerated their base period protection and support levels to protect themselves against making significant
«real» cuts.
22 Thus, an overhang of 50% would suggest that a reduction of at least 51% would be required in the bound rate before real inroads
into market access will be achieved.
23 Given the broad disaggregation of the sectors in the GTAP database, only «average» tariff reductions are applied to commodities
which fall within each band. Thus, there is no account for the possibility of strategically higher reductions in some tariffs within a
tier, to compensate for smaller reductions elsewhere, such that averages are met.
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Table 1. Model aggregation
I. Chosen Sectoral Aggregation (24 GTAP Sectors in bold)
Rice (rice) – paddy rice; Wheat (wheat) – soft and durum wheat; Other Grains (ograins) – rye, sorghum, barley, oats,
maize, millet, other cereals; Vegetables, Fruit and Nuts (vegfrunuts)– all vegetables, fruits and nuts; Oilseeds (oilseeds)
– oilseeds and oleaginous fruits; Sugar (sugar) – sugar cane and beet; Plant Based Fibers (Plants) – raw vegetable mate-
rials used in textiles; Other Crops (ocrops) – seeds, live plants, flowers, beverage and spice crops, unmanufactured to-
bacco, plants used in perfumery, pharmacy, insecticidal, fungicidal or similar purposes; cereal straw and husks, fodder and
forage crops; other raw vegetable materials; Cattle and Sheep (catshp) – live bovine cattle, sheep and goats for fattening,
horses, asses, mules; Pigs and Poultry (pigspoultry) – live swine and poultry for fattening, other animals; eggs, honey,
snails and frogs legs; Raw Milk (milk) – dairy and other cows; Wool (wool) – animal materials used in textiles; Fishing
(Fishing) – All f ishing activities including fish farms and hatcheries; Meat processing (meatpro) – red meat products (bo-
vine, sheep and goat); edible offals and animal oils and fats; Other meat processing (omeatpro) – white meat products,
edible offals and animal oils and fats; Vegetable oils and fats (vegoilsfats) – Oils of: Coconuts, cottonseeds, groundnuts,
oilseeds, olives, palmkernels, rice brans, rape and mustard, soyabeans, sunflower seeds; and fats; Dairy (dairy) – all dairy
products; Rice processing (ricepro) – milled rice; Sugar processing (sugarpro) – Refined sugar, sweeteners; Other Food
Processing (ofoodpro) – prepared and preserved sea food products, vegetables and fruits, bakery and confectionary 
products, pastas and flours; Beverages and Tobacco (bevstobac) – Cigarettes, Cigars etc., Wines and Spirits, Beer; Raw
materials (NaturalRes) – Coal, oil, gas, minerals, Petroleum and coal products; Manufacturing (mnfcs) – Textiles; wea-
ring apparel; leather, wood and paper products and publishing; chemical, rubber and plastic products; ferrous metals; Other
metal products; motor vehicles and parts; transport equipment; electronic equipment; machinery and parts. Services (svces)
– Utilities (Gas, water, electricity); construction; trade services; transport (air, sea, road); communications; f inancial ser-
vices; insurance; other business services; recreation and other services; dwellings; public administration/defence/health,
education.
II. Chosen Regional Aggregation (9 Regions)
Spain, France, Germany, UK, EU3 (Austria, Netherlands, Sweden), EU8 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal); AC10 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slova-
kia, Slovenia); AC2 (Bulgaria, Romania), Rest of the World (ROW).
Table 2. Description of the baseline
Baseline scenario assumptions: 2001-2020
1. Projections
— Productivity, population change, real growth, skilled and
unskilled labour changes.
2. Uruguay round commitments
— Enforce developed country commitments on tariffs and
export subsidies.
— Complete developing country commitments on tariffs
and export subsidies.
3. EU enlargement to 27 members
— Remove all border protection (i.e., export subsidies, im-
port tariffs) between all 27 member states.
— Impose common external tariff for the new EU members
of the customs union.
4. Agenda 2000 (A2000) commitments and the Mid Term
Review (MTR)
— Modelling of CAP (CAP budget, modulation, quotas,
set-aside, intervention prices, stockpurchases).
— Reduction of intervention prices under A2000 and MTR
reforms.
— Imposition of set-aside for the «new» EU member 
states.
— Milk quota adjustments under the MTR. Sugar quota un-
changed.
— Full implementation of the single farm payment (i.e., to-
tal decoupling) under the MTR.
— Removal of coupled support components from the do-
mestic support.
— Implementation of Modulation and abolition of the UK
Rebate (by 2020).
5. Chinese accession
— Unilateral tariff reductions by China.
6. Everything but arms (EBA) deal
— Developing country trade weighted tariff rate elimina-
tions by the EU25 on imports from the EBA.
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consumption24. In the framework document (WTO,
2004), countries are also allowed to choose a list of
«sensitive» products, which will receive special treatment
(i.e., lower tariff cuts). This important policy initiative
was implemented into scenario 2.
A review of the Falconer document (WTO, 2007)
reveals that considerable uncertainty remains about
which products are to be bestowed with «sensitive»
status. In Jean et al. (2005), sensitive products are
determined on the basis of the tariff revenue forgone
in the benchmark period from implementation of the
formula being used (i.e., harmonised, light harmonised,
proportional). A limitation of this approach is that it
assumes that the value of imports remains unchanged,
although it is certainly more reliable than only using
the tariff rate as a guide25. Moreover, this measurement
concept does implicitly take account of the (political)
importance of the commodity (i.e., size of the tariff
revenue), the height of the applied tariff compared with
the c.i.f. import price, and the distance between the
binding and applied tariff rates (i.e. the revenue fall
under each formula is a function of this «distance»).
In scenario 2, it is assumed that 5% of the most sensitive
tariff lines are given special treatment, whilst it is
assumed that the tariff lines under sensitive status will
experience a liberalisation equivalent to a 15% reduction
from their initial binding tariff levels.
In remaining (manufacturing) sectors, considerable
uncertainty remains regarding the format of the final
tariff reduction formula. As the focus of this paper is
on agro-food market access issues, a simpler treatment
is applied to the manufacturing sector by assuming that
Table 3. Doha round tariff elimination scenarios
Scenario Description
S1 Agro-food: harmonising tariff reduction formula; Non agri-food: 50% cut for developed, 33% cut for develo-
ping, 0% cut for LDCs; Import quota increased to 5% of present consumption; Blue Box «de minimis» cap of
2.5%; 70% (50%) Amber Box reduction for developed (developing) countries; Eliminate export subsidies.
S2 Agro-food: harmonising tariff reduction formula + 5% of sensitive product tariff lines; Non Agri-food: 50%
cut for developed, 33% cut for developing, 0% cut for LDCsa; Import quota increased to 5% of present con-
sumption; Blue Box «de minimis» cap of 2.5%; 70% (50%) Amber Box reduction for developed (developing)
countries; Eliminate export subsidies.
S3 Agro-food: «Light» harmonising tariff reduction formula (10% points weaker); Non agro-food: 50% cut for
developed, 33% cut for developing, 0% cut for LDCs; Import quota increased to 5% of present consumption;
Blue Box «de minimis» cap of 2.5%; 70% (50%) Amber Box reduction for developed (developing) countries;
eliminate export subsidies.
a LDC: less developed country.
Table 4. Revised tariff reduction formula: Scenarios 1, 2 
and 3
Harmonising tariff reduction formula
Developed countries Developing countries
Existing binding Tariff Existing binding Tariff
tariff cut tariff cut
> 90% 75% > 120% 60%
> 15 and ≤ 90% 70% > 60 ≤ 120% 50%
≤ 15% 45% > 20 ≤ 60% 40%
≤ 20% 35%
«Light» harmonising tariff reduction formula
Developed countries Developing countries
Existing binding Tariff Existing binding Tariff
tariff cut tariff cut
> 90% 65% > 120% 50%
> 15 and ≤ 90% 60% > 60 ≤ 120% 40%
≤ 15% 35% > 20 ≤ 60% 30%
≤ 20% 25%
24 The Falconer document details a more complex treatment of TRQ increases. However, given the sectoral aggregation in GTAP,
it was decided not to apply «blanket» quota increases on aggregate agro-food sectors, which may only apply to specific commodities.
Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of the model suggests that TRQ increases of between 3% of consumption to 8% have relatively
small impacts on the model results.
25 Jean et al. (2005) note that it is highly unlikely that a member country would designate «sensitive status» to products with high
tariffs and yet small levels of trade (and therefore tariff revenue).
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binding tariff rates are reduced 50% in the developed
countries, 33% in the developing countries, and zero
% in the least developed countries.
Results
Trade, output, market and world prices
Table 5 shows changes in Spanish trade balances,
market prices and output compared with the baseline
for each of the sectors of the model. In most agro-food
sectors, market prices fall, resulting in aggregate
agriculture and food sector price falls. The variance in
price falls across Spanish agro-food sectors reflects
the differing levels of sectoral trade protection (export
subsidies and import tariffs) and support (Amber and
Blue Boxes), the tariff binding overhang, the pattern
of Spanish trade and the size of the Armington substi-
tution elasticities. In the database, the majority of agro-
food trade occurs in the downstream food sectors, where
market price falls are motivated by cheaper imports of
intermediate inputs and the elimination of the subsidy
wedge between internal export prices and free on board
(f.o.b.) export prices. In primary agricultural sectors,
market prices are also influenced, albeit to a lesser
extent, by trade policy changes, but also by reduced
demand from contracting downstream sectors and the
relative levels of support in competing industries.
In raw milk and primary sugar sectors, a quota is
modelled, although in the latter case, the quota rent is
zero, implying a non-binding status26. Thus, in raw
Table 5. Spanish trade balances, market pices and output1
vs. Baseline
Trade balance (€m) Market prices (%) Output(%)
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Rice –26.2 –6.4 –20.8 –1.46 – –1.29 –36.20 –8.57 –29.09
Wheat 19.9 3.3 13.7 –1.37 – –1.28 3.13 1.28 2.37
Ograins 3.7 1.2 2.8 –1.51 – –1.38 + 1.21 +
Vegfrunuts –186.7 –76.8 –157.9 –1.33 – –1.13 –1.53 – –1.31
Oilseeds 34.4 8.2 25.9 – – – 4.08 3.64 3.99
Sugar2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.2 –1.72 –1.16 –1.57 –3.72 –2.05 –3.35
Plants –0.1 –0.3 –0.1 7.60 8.01 7.72 –4.52 –4.08 –4.39
Ocrops 25.3 15.7 21.1 – – – – – –
Catshp –18.0 –7.3 –14.6 –2.23 –1.21 –1.93 –7.80 –3.43 –6.43
Pigspoultry 6.0 2.0 3.7 –1.58 –1.11 –1.44 – – –
Raw milk2 1.7 1.6 1.7 –9.55 –8.25 –9.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wool –0.2 0.3 0.0 –1.07 – – + + +
Fishing –78.2 –83.8 –80.0 4.97 5.19 5.04 –4.14 –4.04 –4.10
Meatpro –252.8 –100.1 –194.7 – – – –8.19 –3.55 –6.74
Omeatpro –26.4 13.5 –18.9 – – – – – –
Vegoilsfats –140.3 –73.6 –117.3 – – – –4.04 –2.23 –3.43
Dairy –89.3 –99.7 –92.9 –3.08 –2.73 –2.98 –1.29 –1.05 –1.25
Ricepro –42.5 –8.7 –34.9 –2.35 –0.89 –1.69 –22.20 –5.18 –18.53
Sugarpro –45.2 –22.0 –40.0 – – – –7.17 –3.96 –6.44
Ofoodpro –227.9 –141.8 –188.8 – – – –1.90 –1.19 –1.65
Bevstobac 4.1 3.0 –0.6 – – – – – –
NaturalRes –15.4 –6.5 –12.4 + + + + + +
Manu 1,103.8 771.2 1,004.8 – – – + + +
Svces 452.3 290.6 399.6 – – – + + +
AGRIC –104.3 –44.3 –95.7 –2.06 –1.37 –1.87 –1.38 – –1.13
FOOD –820.3 –429.3 –688.1 – – – –2.12 –1.13 –1.82
AGFOOD –924.7 –473.6 –783.8 –1.09 – – –1.89 – –1.61
Total 537.8 497.9 528.2
1 +/– indicates a change of less than 1%. 2 Quota constrained sector. €m: million euros.
26 The sugar quota rent estimate for Spain is taken from Frandsen et al. (2003) and European Commission (2005).
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milk, larger market price reductions reflect the decline
in calibrated quota rents27 due to reduced demand from
the downstream dairy sector. Since market access in
processed sugar is greatly reduced (due to the tariff
binding overhang), the demand for primary sugar is
not signif icantly affected, resulting in small market
price falls. In contrast, in the plant fibres and fishing
sectors, the reduction of output subsidies (Amber box)
payments results in price increases in both sectors28.
Comparing between scenarios one to three, the
market price falls (rises) across all sectors are largest
(smallest) in scenario one, because this scenario contains
the largest tariff cuts. Interestingly, market price re-
ductions in scenario 3 (light harmonising formula) are
greater than in scenario 2 (scenario one plus 5% sensitive
product lines), which suggests greater market access
in the former.
In the non-food manufacturing and services sectors,
market prices fall slightly relative to the baseline. As
noted earlier, in this study labour and capital factor
transfer is modelled as «sluggish» between agricultural/
non-agricultural uses in order to capture differing wage
rates between agricultural and non agricultural labour
and capital. As a result, with trade liberalisation and
reduced agricultural support, factors are sectorally
trapped within the agriculture sector, whilst the uptake
of factors into expanding non-food activities is also
muted. Accordingly, the greater is the contraction in
agriculture the more factor prices fall compared with
the baseline. In Spain, the regional index of factor
prices falls 0.40%, 0.34% and 0.39% in scenarios one,
two and three respectively (not shown). This has impli-
cations for the terms of trade discussed later.
As expected greater EU agro-food market access
and reduced agricultural support leads to deteriorating
trade balances and supply responsiveness in the Spanish
food sectors in comparison with the baseline. In primary
agriculture, contractions in «paddy rice», «vegetables
fruits and nuts», «sugar cane/beet» and «cattle and
sheep» are largely motivated by reduced demand from
downstream food sectors, whilst «plant fibre» output
falls due to the reduction in considerable Amber Box
support. In contrast, «wheat», «other grains» and
«oilseeds» have very little (or zero) tariff protection,
whilst the majority of support is already transferred
into the SFP in the baseline. Consequently, there is land
reallocation into these activities resulting in output and
trade balance gains. Examining tariff concessions on
sensitive products (scenario 2), the impacts on output
and trade balances are moderated. In particular, on
Mediterranean sensitive crops such as «vegetables
fruits and nuts», output and trade balance impacts are
approximately halved. Overall, the agro-food trade
balance deteriorates between €474 m (scenario two)
and €925 m (scenario one).
Table 6 shows that percentage changes in world
prices relative to the baseline are negligible in many
cases due to opposing forces. On the one hand, the 
Table 6. Percentage changes in world prices in all three scenarios relative to the baseline1
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Rice –2.88 1.25 –1.53 Fishing + + +
Wheat + 1.29 + Meatpro + + +
Ograins 1.24 1.72 1.38 Omeatpro – + –
Vegfrunuts – + – Vegoilsfats + 1.02 +
Oilseeds 3.16 3.36 3.23 Dairy 3.36 3.65 3.45
Sugar –1.25 – –1.00 Ricepro –2.76 + –1.56
Plants + 1.28 1.10 Sugarpro – + –
Ocrops – + – Ofoodpro – + –
Catshp – – – Bevstobac – + –
Pigspoultry – – – NaturalRes + + +
Milk –2.31 –1.37 –1.99 Manu – – –
Wool – + – Svces – – –
1 +/– indicates a change of less than 1%.
27 This follows, since producers get the quota rent in the form of a higher producer price rather than as a transfer payment.
28 Under the Common Fisheries Policy, a considerable proportion of support is classified as production distorting (i.e., Amber
Box). Moreover, Spain receives approximately 45% of the EU’s financial instrument for fisheries guidance. In the case of the plant
fibres sector, production aids on fibre flax and hemp constitute approximately 13% of the sectors output.
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reduction of domestic support and elimination of export
subsidies reduce (developed country) excess supply
on world markets. This has the effect of increasing
world prices for many agro-food commodities relative
to the baseline. This trend is observed in scenario 2,
where tariff cuts are weakest given the inclusion of
«sensitive» product exceptions, and export subsidy and
domestic support reforms dominate. On the other hand,
when tariff cuts are deeper in scenarios 1 and 3, (deve-
loped country) imports rise, whilst (developing country)
exports increase in response through domestic resource
reallocations into agro-food sectors. In Table 6, (deve-
loping country) export increases dominate, such that
relative to scenario 2, world prices fall in scenarios 1
and 3.
Real income changes
To measure the macro impact of the Doha scenarios,
an equivalent variation (EV) measure of real income
changes is reported for Spain, France, Germany, the
UK, EU15 and EU27 (Table 7). The EV measure is
decomposed into terms of trade effects, eff iciency
effects, CAP Budget effects and «other». The terms of
trade measures changes in the rate of exchange between
export and import prices. In the context of a CGE model,
import tariff and export subsidy changes (i.e., relative
trade competitiveness) affect trade prices directly,
whilst «second round» resource reallocation impacts
on factor prices also influence export prices. Allocative
efficiency is a measure of resource usage measured by
changes in «marginal social values» (Huff and Hertel,
2001). More specifically, a subsidised activity is consi-
dered wasteful in that in incurs more resources than
under free market conditions. Thus, policies which pro-
mote less resource usage in subsidised activities, or
reductions in the subsidies themselves, are considered
as efficient (i.e., less resource wastage). The opposite
logic applies in the case of a tax. The «CAP» budget
effect measures changes from each EU member’s con-
tributory positions with respect to the agricultural
Table 7. Aggregate EU welfare effects
Spain France Germany UK EU15 EU27
S1 (Tiered harmonised tariff cuts)
Equivalent variation (€m) –98.1 462.1 1,321.1 1,118.5 4,833.8 5,003.8
Per capita utility (%) –0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08
Of which: 
— Terms of trade (€m) –109.5 75.1 155.4 –230.0 291.8 9.9
— Allocative efficiency (€m) 348.4 477.5 852.0 1,329.4 5,266.8 5,442.1
— CAP budget (€m) –333.8 –73.9 331.8 28.2 –663.3 –386.3
— Other (€m) –3.2 –16.6 –18.1 –9.0 –61.5 –61.9
S2 (S1 + sensitive product tariff cuts)
Equivalent variation (€m) –283.8 430.4 1,086.1 386.3 2,687.9 2,823.7
Per capita utility (%) –0.06 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04
Of which: 
— Terms of trade (€m) –35.5 121.7 168.0 –115.9 634.7 443.4
— Allocative efficiency (€m) 60.1 298.1 541.5 374.4 2,543.6 2,603.4
— CAP budget (€m) –307.6 22.9 388.9 134.1 –451.9 –184.6
— Other (€m) –0.8 –12.4 –12.2 –6.3 –38.4 –38.6
S3 («lighter» harmonisation tariff cuts)
Equivalent variation (€m) –116.7 473.8 1,245.8 946.7 4,302.0 4,457.0
Per capita utility (%) –0.03 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07
Of which: 
— Terms of trade (€m) –89.1 76.2 148.9 –201.3 327.4 62.3
— Allocative efficiency (€m) 301.1 436.4 776.5 1,128.4 4,652.1 4,797.3
— CAP budget (€m) –326.1 –22.9 337.1 27.8 –620.4 –345.2
— Other (€m) –2.6 –15.9 –16.7 –8.3 –57.1 –57.4
€m: million euros.
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component of the EU budget, and unlike the former
study, also includes the impacts of stock purchases,
which are modelled as withdrawals of real income from
the circular flow29. The «other» category is an EV (money
metric) measure of changes in: (i) household incomes
from exogenous endowment shocks, (ii) values of
production and demands from exogenous productivity
shocks and (iii) population impacts on per capita
welfare. The residual impact from these elements is
small, given that the same shocks also appear in the
baseline scenario.
Unlike France, Germany and the UK, Spain exhibits
welfare losses in all of the Doha scenarios (Table 7),
although in each case, these losses are moderate. In
scenario 2 where tariff cuts are the lowest, the Spanish
economy loses by €284m or 0.06% of per capita income.
In contrast, in scenario one, where tariff cuts are deepest,
this loss is reduced to €98m or 0.02% of per capita
income. Decomposing this result, Spanish allocative
efficiency increases due to the reduction in both sub-
sidies and agricultural activity, and greater non-food
specialisation.
On the other hand, Spain exhibits losses in each of
the terms of trade and CAP budget components. As
noted earlier, given the «sluggish» transfer of factors
between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors, sec-
torally trapped resources depress factor prices compared
with the baseline. Consequently, the ratio of Spanish
export prices falls by more than import prices. In other
EU members (France, Germany), it appears that factor
price falls from contractions in agriculture are less
influential than the reduction in import prices from
liberalisation, leading to terms of trade rises.
Decomposing the CAP budget30 results (Table 8) the
main losses in Spain are from the elimination in export
subsidies and Amber Box subsidy reductions. Stocks
are modelled as a withdrawal from the circular flow of
income so appear as negative real income changes. In
Spain, most stock purchases occur in the «other grains»
and «dairy» sectors, with limited intervention purchases
in «wheat». In addition, Spain (unlike France, Germany
and the UK) receives a larger proportion of CAP budget
funding31 than it pays in. Accordingly, contraction in
support payments will benefit net payers such as Germany
and the UK, whilst in the Spanish case reductions in
GDP contributions do not offset the losses in support
payments.
Finally, examining the global welfare gains (not
shown) under the deepest Doha tariff cuts in scenario
one, the world economy is estimated to gain €23,600m.
The reduction in the tariff harmonisation formula by
10% points (scenario 3) yields a smaller global gain
of €18,200m, whilst the inclusion of sensitive product
concessions (scenario 2) yields a paltry global gain
estimate of €6,900m.
Discussion
A review of the trade literature reveals that there is
still a paucity of DDR impact assessment research for
the EU, and in particular for individual EU member
states. In the case of Spain, only one previous study
exists (Philippidis, 2005), whilst in this paper, a number
of modelling and policy shortcomings in the aforemen-
tioned study are addressed employing the latest de-
velopments in the applied trade literature. From a
Table 8. Equivalent variation changes (€millions) in 
Spanish net common agricultural policy (CAP) contribu-
tions compared with the baseline
S1 S2 S3
CAP Budget (=1+2-3-4-5) –333.8 –307.6 –326.1
1. CAP expenditure –637.6 –631.4 –635.6
Of which:
— Direct payments 0.0 0.0 0.0
— Export subsidies –193.7 –193.6 –193.7
— Amber Box support –433.6 –433.1 –433.4
— Intermediate input subsidies –10.2 –4.7 –8.5
2. Stock purchases –54.3 –52.8 –54.0
3. 75% of agricultural tariff 
revenues –13.9 –6.6 –10.6
4. GDP contribution –309.4 –334.5 –318.2
5. UK rebate payment –34.9 –35.5 –34.7
29 The budget does not net to zero across the EU27 since the changes are money metric (EV), which are a function of the price
index in each EU region.
30 In the CAP budget, each region makes payments to Brussels in the form of 75% of their agricultural tariff revenues, VAT and
GDP contributions. In the GTAP model, VAT data is lacking. Thus, assuming a balanced «agricultural» budget, it is assumed that
the difference between what EU27 regions receive (i.e., support payments) and pay from their agricultural tariff revenues, is a
«resource» cost from the CAP budget, which is covered by a flat rate GDP tax on all regions.
31 Much of this is due to tobacco, olive oil, wine and fisheries support payments.
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modelling perspective, there is greater effort to capture
the rigidities apparent in agricultural factor-, input-
and product-markets, whilst the quality of CAP modelling
is enhanced to include intervention stock purchases,
the exclusion of national payments from the CAP
budget and improved estimates of quota rents and set
aside changes. From a policy perspective, this study
accounts for the binding overhang in the tariffs, thereby
better reflecting the true level of market access from
a potential agreement, whilst a further scenario examines
the importance on trade and welfare from the inclusion
of «sensitive» product lines within the harmonised
tariff formula.
Comparing between both studies, there are consi-
derable differences in sectoral prices, outputs and trade
flows. In the highly protected downstream food sectors,
market price falls are smaller, due to the tariff binding
overhangs and the greater sensitivity of EU consumers
to intra-EU price changes. Examining specific sectors,
processed sugar (sugarpro), vegetables oils and fats
(vegoilsfats) and meat processing (meatpro) sectors
all have smaller price falls, whilst in paddy rice and
the downstream rice sector where tariff protection is
74% and 124% respectively, Spanish market price
reductions are also relatively minor. In the dairy sector,
the inclusion of intervention purchases now limits the
size of the market price fall in Spain.
In the primary agriculture sectors, the baseline now
only includes the removal of coupled support by sector
in accordance with the 2003 reforms (vis-à-vis complete
removal of all domestic support). Consequently, primary
agricultural price fluctuations compared with the baseline
are now larger in this study with prescribed reductions
in remaining EU Amber Box and Blue Box support. In
the raw milk sector, the price falls (up to 10%) are
considerably larger in this study due to the usage of a
larger benchmark quota rent estimates in the milk
sector. By contrast, in this study price falls in the primary
sugar sector are much smaller due to the non-binding
quota status (i.e., zero quota rent) and considerable
tariff binding overhang in downstream sugar processing.
In addition, in the oilseeds sector prices now fall
slightly relative to the baseline, purely due to EU tariff
reductions. In Philippidis (2005) oilseeds prices rose
relative to the baseline since only part of the olive oil
support payments had been included within the SFP.
Examining non agro-food sectors, market prices fall
slightly relative to the baseline, which contrasts with
Philippidis (2005). In that study, capital and labour
types are perfectly mobile between agricultural and
non-agricultural uses, with the result that expanding
non-agro-food sectors bid up the price of primary
factors, which is passed on as market price rises. In
this study, the sluggishness of capital and labour transfer
leads to factor price falls in Spain. This effect has
implications for the terms of trade discussed below.
Examining the trade balances, in our scenario one,
the agro-food trade balance deteriorates by €925m,
which is greater than the equivalent statistic of €321m
estimated in Philippidis (2005)32. That our agro-food
trade balance deteriorations are greater, is due to the
modelling of intra-EU and extra-EU trade preferences
to capture increased harmonisation of EU product
standards. A feature of this characterisation is that non-
EU and EU imports compete at a lower Armington
substitution elasticity (vis-à-vis the «standard» GTAP
model)33. Thus, when non-EU import prices decrease
in a trade liberalisation experiment, EU market pe-
netration by non-EU countries is reduced since EU
consumers’ exhibit reduced price sensitivity on non-
EU varieties and greater price sensitivity to EU varieties.
With no trade barriers between the EU27, changes
in intra-EU relative prices (and trade) are a function
of factor price movements from resource reallocations
related to (i) the liberalisation of tariffs and eliminations
in export subsidies on third country trade and (ii)
reductions in Amber and Blue Box support. In the
GTAP data, 69% (65%) of Spanish agro-food (total)
trade is with EU partners, which when coupled with
greater EU price sensitivity, results in considerably
larger trade shifts than in the «standard» GTAP model.
Spain’s total trade balance improves in scenarios one,
two and three by €538m, €498m and €528m respec-
tively, implying that manufacturing and services trade
balances (and output) improve compared with the
baseline. This reflects a degree of resource reallocation
into non-food activities as well as increased export
opportunities from falling factor price costs. A similar
trend also occurs in Philippidis (2005), although in our
study, improvements in Spanish services and manu-
facturing trade balances are greater due to greater
competitiveness from falling factor prices.
32 The estimate of €321m corresponds to the «high market» access scenario which implements a «slightly» stricter, but comparable,
tariff harmonisation formula than employed in our scenario 1.
33 See the appendix for a discussion of our chosen Armington structure.
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Examining Spanish real income changes, both
studies predict welfare losses due to Spain’s larger than
proportional share of agricultural and fisheries support
and smaller than proportional share of budget contri-
butions. However, in this study (unlike Philippidis,
2005), Spain loses in all Doha scenarios since both
CAP budget and terms of trade effects are negative,
although these losses are mitigated by greater allocative
efficiency gains under «high» market access, which
suggests that Spain should be lobbying in favour of
greater tariff cuts. The terms of trade are negative in
this study (in contrast to Philippidis, 2005) due to the
different modelling assumption regarding the treatment
of capital and labour mobility between agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors. The CAP budget impacts are
comparable despite the inclusion in our study of stock
purchase losses. This is because in our study, tariff re-
venue contributions to Brussels remain higher due to
lower tariff cutting commitments (i.e. tariff bindings),
which (at least partially) offsets necessary additional Spa-
nish GDP contributions to finance EU stock purchases.
For the EU bloc as a whole, real income gains are
larger than in Philippidis (2005) due to increased trade
gains from greater substitution possibilities on intra-
EU trade demands, whilst concurrently, non-EU trade
gains (and consequently global gains) are tempered.
As noted, with reduced price sensitivity to non-EU
goods, EU market penetration is reduced. Furthermore,
market access is now moderated by tariff binding
overhangs. Comparing between studies, the estimate
in global welfare in scenario one is approximately one-
third lower than the comparable «high» (€32,500m)
tariff cut scenario in Philippidis (2005).
An additional dimension of this study is the incor-
poration of reduced tariff liberalisation on sensitive
product lines. Whilst there is much debate on which
product categories and what percentage of tariff lines
this will affect, it constitutes an important component
of the negotiations on the agricultural market access
modalities. The EU are currently lobbying for 8% of
tariff lines to be included within this clause, as opposed
to the US stance of 1% of tariff lines, whilst in scenario
2, a «middle ground» position of 5% is taken. In the
case of Spain, the results clearly show that agricultural
and food sectors (particularly red meat sectors) benefit
from such reductions in market access, although this
is to the detriment of the broader economy. Indeed,
Spain makes a net loss of €284m (or 0.06% per capita
utility) compared with the baseline. An examination
of the potential gains from abolition of all agro-food
trade protection and support shows that the global
economy could gain €55,300m with respect to our
baseline (compared with €6,900m in scenario 2).
Given EU insistence on the inclusion of sensitive
products, scenario 2 arguably represents the most
«realistic» experiment, although corresponding estimates
of global welfare gains expose the lack of ambition in
the DDR.
As a major dependent of the construction boom,
which accounts for as much as 18% of GDP (twice the
share in other European countries) (Economist, 2008),
the Spanish economy is now beginning to falter, whilst
inflation and unemployment are rising. In addition,
«uncontrolled» increases in immigration, which have
undoubtedly contributed to improvements in productivity
and lower real wages, have become a source of political
contention. In the current global economic downturn,
Spain and other developed countries must not allow
protectionist sentiment (which is currently gripping
the USA) to completely derail the Doha talks. Unfortu-
nately, developed WTO members have so far demons-
trated their reticence to put pragmatic economic
rational before short to medium term political expediency,
whilst in the context of the welfare estimates presented
here, the current reality is that any hypothetical Doha
deal is likely to go down in history as a missed oppor-
tunity both for Spain and the rest of the world.
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Appendix
The structure of intra-EU and extra-EU
import demands in each EU region
In the upper Armington nest (Fig. 1), total demands
for commodity «i» in each EU region «s» (totdemi,s)
are composed of non-EU commodity imports and EU
commodity imports. The CES elasticity of substitution
between these demands is σD, which is equal to the
equivalent nest in the standard GTAP model treatment.
In the second nest (left hand side), EU commodity
imports are composed of domestic goods (eudomi,s)
and intra-EU imports (euimpi,s). The CES elasticity of
substitution between these demands is double the
elasticity parameter σD. In the second nest (right hand
side), bilateral extra-EU imports from each non-EU
region («r») to EU region «s» compete at the standard
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bilateral imports elasticity of substitution (σM). Finally,
in the bottom nest, bilateral intra-EU imports from
each EU region («r») to EU region «s» compete at the
elasticity of substitution value which is double the
standard substitution elasticity (σM). In this structure,
intra- and extra-EU imports compete at the elasticity
σD, whilst in the standard GTAP, intra- and extra-EU
imports compete at the higher elasticity σM (= 2x σD).
This implies that EU consumers are much less price
sensitive to extra-EU imports and more price sensitive
to intra-EU imports.
Three level CET land allocation nest
In Figure 2, land substitutability (bottom nest) is
highest between «wheat», «other grains» and «oilseeds».
Reduced land substitutability in the second nest is mo-
delled between «cereals oilseeds and protein crops»,
COP, (i.e., composite of «wheat», «other grains» and
«oilseeds»), «primary sugar» (SUG) and each of the
livestock and raw milk sectors, which have been sim-
plified in the diagram as a single sector «LVSK». In
the top nest, the «low» land substitutability is between
composite «field crops and pasture sectors» (FCP),
«other crops» (OCR) and «vegetables fruits and nuts»
(VFN) sectors. The elasticity of transformation value
is taken from the GTAP-AGR model of Keeney and
Hertel (= 0.25), whilst in lower nests, the elasticities
are merely doubled and quadrupled, respectively. The
bottom level transformation elasticity is therefore equal
to the «standard» GTAP CET value (= 1), which implies
that land mobility in this model variant is lower than
in the standard GTAP model.
Figure 1. The Armington demand structure in the EU regions.
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Figure 2. Three nested land allocation structure in the modi-
fied GTAP model.
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